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Abstract
This study conducts a comprehensive investigation into the investment value of sell-side 
analyst recommendation revisions in the UK, using a unique dataset from 1995 to 2013. 
Our rolling window analysis shows that, on average, upgrades fail to generate any sig-
nificantly positive abnormal returns in any period of time, even before transaction costs. 
In addition, although downgrades could generate significantly negative abnormal gross 
returns over some periods of time, these observed significant returns disappear after 
accounting for transaction costs. Overall, our bootstrapping simulations confirm sell-side 
analysts’ lack of skill in making valuable up/downward revisions to cover the size of trans-
action costs, irrespective of whether these revisions are made by high-ranking brokerage 
houses or not. However, an industry-based analysis shows that, within two high-tech indus-
try sectors, i.e., Health Care and Technology sectors, sell-side analysts possess certain skill 
in making valuable downgrades over some periods of time and, in particular, such skill is 
sufficient to offset transaction costs.
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1 Introduction
Sell-side analysts working for brokerage houses play an important role in the capital mar-
kets by collecting and analyzing a variety of market, industry, and firm-specific information 
and then making stock recommendations.1 These stock recommendations, disseminated 
through electronic and print media, have been widely used by investors in their investment 
decisions. Whether sell-side analyst recommendations can truly create investment value 
and promote market efficiency has been of great interest to financial academics. The related 
literature can stretch as back as the pioneering study of Cowles (1933), which shows that 
investors are not able to add value to the market when they follow analyst recommenda-
tions. The inability of financial analysts to predict stock price movements is confirmed by 
numerous following studies (see, e.g., Colker 1963; Logue and Tuttle 1973; Groth et al. 
1979; among others), in spite of a substantial amount of money spent by brokerage houses 
on security analysis (Grossman and Stiglitz 1980).2 In contrast, Stickel (1995) and Wom-
ack (1996) report that upgrades (downgrades)—favorable (unfavorable) changes in analyst 
recommendations—are accompanied by significantly positive (negative) returns at the time 
of their announcements. Barber et al. (2001) prove the existence of profitable investment 
strategies based on publicly available analyst recommendations, presenting a challenge to 
the semi-strong form of efficient market hypothesis (EMH). However, these investment 
strategies require a great deal of trading and generate considerable transaction costs, sug-
gesting that the observed market inefficiencies are not easily exploitable by investors (see, 
also, Jegadeesh et al. 2004; Mikhail et al. 2004). Altinkiliç and Hansen (2009) further call 
into question the information role played by financial analysts in that their stock recom-
mendation revisions often piggyback on public information (e.g., corporate events and 
news), thus providing investors with little incremental information (see, also, Altinkiliç 
et al. 2013).
Despite the existence of extensive sell-side analyst research in the US, empirical evi-
dence on the investment value of analyst recommendations remains mixed. Jegadeesh and 
Kim (2006, p. 275) argue that an in-depth examination in other developed markets “will 
give us a more comprehensive picture of the extent to which the unique skill of analysts are 
useful for investors”. The UK stock market, a highly developed and sophisticated market, 
provides us with an appropriate setting to shed additional light on the existing controversy 
within this area of research, while it has received very scant attention in the financial litera-
ture. For example, Dimson and Fraletti (1986) examine an unpublished sample of 1649 tel-
ephone recommendations made by a leading UK brokerage house in 1983, but they find no 
significant abnormal returns for the recommended stocks. Ryan and Taffler (2006, p. 372) 
argue that the study of Dimson and Fraletti (1986) examines stock recommendations made 
by “a single UK brokerage house only and is biased towards large capitalization stocks”. 
Ryan and Taffler (2006) investigate a sample of 2506 changes in analyst recommendations 
1 Sell-side analysts typically work for brokerage houses (or investment banks) and make stock recommen-
dations to investors in the capital markets, while buy-side analysts usually work for pension fund or mutual 
fund firms and make stock recommendations to money managers of the fund that employs them. This study 
focuses on stock recommendation revisions, exclusively made by sell-side analysts working for brokerage 
houses in the UK.
2 Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) argue that if prices fully reflect all available information, then the use of 
analyst recommendations cannot generate superior returns, and brokerage houses should not spend large 
sums of money on security analysis, nor should market participants have any incentive to pay for such 
costly information.
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made by six London-based brokerage houses from December 1993 to June 1995, showing 
that stock prices are significantly affected by analyst recommendation revisions.
Given the limited observations and short sample periods examined in prior UK studies, 
which generally suffer from small sample bias, this study aims to conduct a comprehensive 
investigation into a novel real-time database, uniquely created by Morningstar Company 
Intelligence. Our final sample consists of 70,220 analyst recommendation revisions for 
stocks either on the main market of the London Stock Exchange (LSE) or on the Alter-
native Investment Market (AIM) from January 1995 to June 2013; as such, our dataset 
is much larger than has been employed in prior UK studies. With the Morningstar data-
base, we take an investor-oriented, calendar-time perspective,3 to assess the performance of 
investment strategies based on UK sell-side analyst recommendation revisions. Our study 
is close to Barber et al. (2001) and Barber et al. (2007), but differs from them in several 
major respects. For example, Barber et al. (2007) include initiations, resumptions, and reit-
erations when constructing their portfolios. However, sell-side analysts often leave their 
stock recommendations unchanged for long periods of time; as a result, these stock rec-
ommendations become stale and less informative over time (see, Jegadeesh et  al. 2004; 
Boni and Womack 2006; Jegadeesh and Kim 2006, 2010). Therefore, unlike Barber et al. 
(2007), we construct two upgrade and downgrade portfolios by exclusively focusing on 
analyst recommendation revisions. Specifically, the upgrade portfolio includes all stocks 
with upward revisions to Strong Buys or Buys from previous Strong Sells, Sells, or Holds, 
while the downgrade portfolio includes all stocks with downward revisions to Strong Sells, 
Sells, or Holds from previous Strong Buys or Buys.
In addition, different from Barber et al. (2001) and Barber et al. (2007), we evaluate the 
performance of the upgrade and downgrade portfolios on a 1-year rolling window basis, 
using the intercepts derived from the single-factor capital asset pricing model (CAPM), 
the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model, the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, and 
the Fama and French (2015) five-factor model. The rolling window analysis, which has 
not been used in prior sell-side analyst research, to the best of our knowledge, enables us 
to more effectively capture the time-varying portfolio performance over the long sample 
period, while the use of various single- and multi-factor models helps rule out the concern 
on the poor model of asset pricing raised by Barber et al. (2001).
Our empirical investigation proceeds in three main parts, showing some interesting 
results that are robust to alternative model specifications. In the first part, we examine 
the time-varying daily abnormal returns (both gross and net of transaction costs) to the 
upgrade and downgrade portfolios using the whole sample of analyst recommendation 
revisions. Specifically, on average, the upgrade portfolio generates no significantly positive 
abnormal gross (or net) returns in any period of time, suggesting that upgrades are in gen-
eral valueless. In contrast, the downgrade portfolio generates significantly negative abnor-
mal gross returns in several periods of time. For example, the negative abnormal gross 
returns to the downgrade portfolio are statistically significant, at least at the 5% level, from 
April 2001 to January 2003, ranging from − 3.50 basis points to − 6.40 basis points, and 
from March 2009 to June 2010, ranging from − 3.45 basis points to − 8.59 basis points. 
However, given the existence of massive portfolio rebalancing, the downgrade portfolio 
3 Barber et al. (2001) point out that event-time analysis is a more analyst-oriented approach, which does not 
measure the profits to an implementable investment strategy (see, also, Stickel 1995; Womack 1996; Ivko-
vic and Jegadeesh 2004; Green 2006; Brown et al. 2009).
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does not generate significant abnormal net returns after taking a reasonable level of trans-
action costs into account.
Although a large number of investment strategies based on analyst recommendation 
revisions fail to make profits after transaction costs, Barber et al. (2001, p. 537) argue that 
“it remains an open question whether other types of trading strategies could be profitable”. 
Inspired by Barber et al. (2001), we further employ two alternative investment strategies 
to assess: (1) whether analyst recommendation revisions made by high-ranking brokerage 
houses are more valuable in the UK; and (2) whether UK analyst recommendation revi-
sions within specific industry sectors can make large enough profits to offset transaction 
costs.
On the one hand, it has been well reported that brokerage houses and their analysts, 
as repetitive players in the capital markets, obtain and accumulate their reputation capital, 
which is directly affected by the performance of stocks they recommend (see, Womack 
1996; Brown et al. 2009). Therefore, it is possible that the superior performance made by 
some star sell-side analysts (e.g., those working for high-ranking brokerage houses) is bal-
anced by the inferior performance made by their non-star counterparts (Fama and French 
2010). In the second part of our empirical investigation, we replicate all analyses in the first 
part using a subsample of 11,016 analyst recommendation revisions exclusively made by 
the top 5 brokerage houses, measured by their positions on the annual All-Europe Research 
Team published by Institutional Investor (see “Appendix 1”). The subsample results, how-
ever, are qualitatively the same as those using the whole sample, suggesting that reputation 
of brokerage houses does not play a significant role in enhancing the investment value of 
sell-side analyst recommendation revisions in the UK.
On the other hand, prior sell-side analyst research controls for a wide range of stock 
characteristics (see, e.g., Stickel 1995; Womack 1996; Jegadeesh et  al. 2004; Anderson 
et al. 2017), other than for industry factor. Jegadeesh et al. (2004, p. 1118) point out that “it 
is possible that analyst recommendation revisions reflect news about a firm’s competitive 
position in its industry”. Boni and Womack (2006) argue that upgrades and downgrades, 
aggregated across all sell-side analysts for stocks within each industry, might generate sig-
nificant abnormal net returns, though they do not explicitly examine the transaction costs. 
Motivated by Jegadeesh et al. (2004) and Boni and Womack (2006), we conduct an indus-
try-based analysis in the third part of our empirical investigation on the performance of 
the upgrade and downgrade portfolios within each industry sector, identified by the two-
digit Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) codes (see “Appendix 2”). Specifically, 
we find no significantly positive abnormal net returns to the upgrade portfolio within any 
industry sector in any period of time. However, within two high-tech industry sectors, i.e., 
Health Care (ICB 45) and Technology (ICB 95) sectors, the downgrade portfolio gener-
ates significantly negative abnormal net returns, at least at the 5% level, in several periods 
of time. For example, within Technology sector, the significantly negative abnormal net 
returns vary from − 3.21 basis points to − 6.44 basis points from September 2001 to March 
2003, and vary from − 2.44 basis points to − 7.45 basis points from December 2006 to 
May 2010; similar evidence is found for the downgrade portfolio within Health Care sec-
tor. The reported incremental investment value is not only statistically significant, but also 
economically meaningful, suggesting the importance of controlling for the industry effect, 
which has never been explored in prior UK sell-side analyst research, to the best of our 
knowledge.
Thus far, our empirical investigation not only provides important evidence to com-
plement the financial literature, but has significant implications for market participants. 
A natural question to ask is whether the reported portfolio performance in our empirical 
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investigation is simply as a result of random chance, i.e., sell-side analysts’ luck. Another 
major contribution of this study is for the first time to introduce a rolling window-based 
time-series bootstrapping simulation method (see details in “Appendix 3”), to distinguish 
sell-side analysts’ luck from their skill (Fama 1998; Barber et al. 2001). Specifically, our 
simulated results confirm that, on average (1) the observed insignificantly positive abnor-
mal returns to the upgrade portfolio could be attributed to sell-side analysts’ lack of skill 
in making valuable upward revisions (even before transaction costs), rather than their bad 
luck; and (2) sell-side analysts have certain skill in making valuable downward revisions 
(before transaction costs) over some periods of time, while such skill is not sufficient to 
cover the size of transaction costs, irrespective of whether these revisions are made by 
high-ranking brokerage houses or not. More importantly, our simulated results confirm that 
sell-side analysts do possess superior skill in making downward revisions for stocks with 
high-tech related characteristics over some periods of time, even after transaction costs.
Overall, this study contributes to sell-side analyst research in several important respects. 
First, this study employs a calendar-time approach to assess the performance of invest-
ment strategies based on UK sell-side analyst recommendation revisions, using a uniquely 
insightful database, Morningstar Company Intelligence, which has never been examined 
before. In addition, our industry-based analyses show that it is likely to make profits by 
short selling stocks with downward revisions within two high-tech industry sectors, i.e., 
Health Care and Technology sectors, over some periods of time even after transaction 
costs, the results of which could be mainly attributed to the greater coverage and efforts 
made by sell-side analysts on high-tech firms with substantial intangible assets (Barth 
et  al. 2001; Barron et  al. 2002). Finally, we develop a time-series bootstrapping simula-
tion method to test whether the observed time-varying investment performance is due to 
random chance (i.e., sell-side analysts’ luck), though our simulation method can be applied 
to distinguish luck from skill when evaluating the calendar-time portfolio performance in 
other types of investments.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 describe data and 
research design, respectively. Section 4 presents empirical and simulated results, while the 
final section concludes.
2  Data and sample description
We obtain the real-time sell-side analyst recommendations from the Morningstar Extracted 
Data File: Historic Broker Recommendations for UK Registered and UK Listed Compa-
nies, uniquely created by Hemscott Company Guru, now part of Morningstar Company 
Intelligence. Each stock recommendation record contains information on the name of the 
covered firm, the name of the brokerage house issuing the recommendation, the recom-
mendation starting and expiration dates, and a rating between 1 and 9. A rating of 1 reflects 
a strong buy, 2 a buy, 3 a weak buy, 4 a weak buy/hold, 5 a hold, 6 a hold/sell, 7 a weak 
sell, 8 a sell, and 9 a strong sell. We exclude stock recommendations that omit the name 
of brokerage houses, those without releasing the expiration dates, and/or those with data 
errors. Also, we require that (1) the gap between the starting and expiration dates of each 
recommendation is less than 1 year to ensure that the brokerage house is actively following 
the recommended stock; and (2) the relevant financial and accounting data of the covered 
firms are available from the London Share Price Database (LSPD).
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Our initial sample is comprised of 384,165 publicly available analyst recommendations 
made by 144 brokerage houses on 2905 distinct firms listed either on the main market of 
the LSE or on the AIM from January 1995 to June 2013. To allow for an easy and intui-
tive comparison with prior US studies, we reclassify all original analyst recommendations 
into five categories: Strong Buys (1 and 2; 44.99%), Buys (3 and 4; 10.66%), Holds (5; 
32.43%), Sells (6 and 7; 3.68%), and Strong Sells (8 and 9; 8.24%). Brown et al. (2009) 
argue that prior sell-side analyst research is generally hampered by a very low proportion 
of negative recommendations (Sells and Strong Sells), e.g., 3.0% in the US (see, Barber 
et al. 2003). Table 1 shows that our Morningstar database overcomes this deficiency with 
much more negative recommendations, e.g., 11.92% of Sells and Strong Sells.
Sell-side analysts, however, often leave their stock recommendations unchanged for long 
periods of time; as a result, these stock recommendations become stale and less informative 
over time, potentially resulting in poor portfolio performance (see, Jegadeesh et al. 2004; 
Boni and Womack 2006; Jegadeesh and Kim 2006 and 2010; Hobbs et al. 2012). There-
fore, our empirical investigation exclusively focuses on analyst recommendation revisions 
that convey more valuable information and have more predictive power over time. Table 2 
presents the matrix of our final sample of 70,220 UK analyst recommendation revisions, 
i.e., 45.04% are Strong Buys and Buys, 38.73% are Holds, and 16.23% are Sells and Strong 
Sells, similar to those reported elsewhere (see, e.g., Stickel 1995; Barber et al. 2001; Boni 
and Womack 2006). The inclusion of 23,235 (33.09%) analyst recommendation revisions 
for 1042 dead firms in our sample also helps avoid the potential survivorship bias.
3  Research design
3.1  Portfolio construction
To evaluate the performance of calendar-time investment strategies, we construct two port-
folios: (1) an upgrade portfolio, consisting of all stocks with upward revisions to Strong 
Buys or Buys from previous Strong Sells, Sells, or Holds; and (2) a downgrade portfolio, 
consisting of all stocks with downward revisions to Strong Sells, Sells, or Holds from pre-
vious Strong Buys or Buys. Specifically, to construct the upgrade portfolio, for each bro-
kerage house, we identify upward revisions to Strong Buys or Buys from previous Holds, 
Sells, or Strong Sells during our sample period. The upgrade portfolio is updated daily; for 
each upward revision, the recommended stock enters the portfolio at the close of trading on 
the day the revision is announced. If an upward revision is announced on a non-trading day, 
the recommended stock is added into the upgrade portfolio at the close of the next trad-
ing day, and remains in the portfolio until the stock is either downgraded or dropped from 
coverage by the brokerage house.4 If a stock is recommended by more than one brokerage 
house on a given date, then that stock will appear multiple times in the upgrade portfolio 
on that date, once for each brokerage house. The downgrade portfolio is constructed in an 
analogous daily fashion.
4 A recent study of Rees et al. (2017) argues that sell-side analysts tend to strategically time the release of 
their recommendation revisions, in particular, to make downgrades on the weekends, as investor and media 
attention to analyst recommendation revisions is reduced on the weekends. However, this is not a serious 
concern about our sample, as only a total of 427 (0.76%) analyst recommendation revisions (187 upwards 
revisions and 240 downward revisions) are released on the weekends.
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Panel A of Table  3 presents the distribution of upward and downward revisions in the 
upgrade and downgrade portfolios, respectively, by the year of analyst recommendation revi-
sions. The total number of sell-side analyst recommendation revisions included in the upgrade 
and downgrade portfolios, 56,075 (25,701 + 30,374), appears to be less than the total number 
of 70,220, as shown in Table 2, which is not surprising, however. The upgrade portfolio does 
not include stocks with upward revisions from Strong Sells to Holds, from Strong Sells to Sell, 
and from Sells to Holds, as they can also be interpreted as negative recommendations, while 
the downgrade portfolio does not include stocks with downward revisions from Strong Buy to 
Buy, as they can also be interpreted as positive recommendations (see, Stickel 1995; Brown 
et al. 2009). Panel B of Table 3 shows that no seasonal patterns are evident in the dataset.
3.2  Portfolio performance evaluation
We calculate the daily value-weighted return from the upgrade and downgrade portfolios on 
date t, Rp,t, as follows:
where Ri,t represents the daily return for the recommended stock i on date t5; np,t−1 repre-
sents the number of revisions in the portfolio p as of the close of trading on date t − 1; and 
(1)Rp,t =
np,t−1∑
i=1
휔i,t−1 × Ri,t,
Table 2  Matrix of UK analyst recommendation revisions
This table presents the matrix of 70,220 UK analyst recommendation revisions from January 1995 to June 
2013. All real-time analyst recommendations are obtained from Morningstar Company Intelligence. A rat-
ing of 1 reflects a strong buy, 2 a buy, 3 a weak buy, 4 a weak buy/hold, 5 a hold, 6 a hold/sell, 7 a weak 
sell, 8 a sell, and 9 a strong sell, which are reclassified into five categories: Strong Buy (1 and 2), Buy (3 
and 4), Hold (5), Sell (6 and 7), and Strong Sell (8 and 9)
From old rating To new rating Total %
Strong 
Buy (1 
and 2)
Buy (3 and 4) Hold (5) Sell (6 and 7) Strong 
Sell (8 
and 9)
Strong Buy (1 and 2) – 5923 14,506 396 977 21,802 31.05
Buy (3 and 4) 5756 – 5242 682 204 11,884 16.92
Hold (5) 12,745 5267 – 2596 4927 25,535 36.36
Sell (6 and 7) 298 630 2410 – 844 4182 5.96
Strong Sell (8 and 9) 833 172 5043 769 – 6817 9.71
Overall 19,632 11,992 27,201 4443 6952 70,220 –
% 27.96 17.08 38.73 6.33 9.90 – 100.00
5 We explicitly exclude the return on the first trading day as many investors, particularly small investors, 
tend to react to information with a delay, as “it is impractical for them to engage in the daily portfolio rebal-
ancing that is needed to respond to the changes” (Barber et al. 2001, p. 534). The value-weighted returns 
enable us to better capture the economic significance of our results, while the equal-weighted returns are, 
on average, biased upward due to the bid-ask bounce (see, Barber et al. 2001, 2003), that is, the returns of 
large size firms will be more heavily represented in the aggregate returns than those of small size firms (see, 
Lyon et al. 1999).
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ωi,t−1 represents the weight of stock i in the portfolio p on date t − 1, that is, the market 
value of stock i as of the close of trading on date t − 1, divided by the aggregate market 
value of all stocks in the portfolio as of the close of trading on date t − 1.
The abnormal return gross of transaction costs is estimated as the intercept term of αp 
derived from the recent Fama and French (2015) five-factor model:
where Rm,t and Rf,t represent the daily returns on the FTSE All-Share Index and on a 
3-month UK T-bill, respectively; SMBt, HMLt, RMWt, and CMAt represent the daily returns 
on zero-investment factor-mimicking portfolios for size, book-to-market (B/M), operating 
profitability, and investment, respectively6; and ɛp,t represents the error term.
We estimate Eq. (2) repeatedly on a rolling window basis—a 1-year window length roll-
ing one trading day forward—to track the performance of the underlying variables over 
time. Specifically, the first rolling window is from January 3, 1995 to December 29, 1995, 
covering 252 trading days, the typical number of trading days in a year in the UK stock 
market. Then a new observation (trading day) is added to the rolling window, while the 
first one is dropped, that is, we update the rolling window to include observations from 
January 4, 1995 to January 2, 1996, and so forth. In each rolling window, the five-factor 
regression yields parameter estimates of αp, βp, sp, hp, rp, and cp; a significantly positive 
(negative) αp indicates that the upgrade (downgrade) portfolio is profitable after control-
ling for risk factors of market, size, value, operating profitability, and investment. This 
calculation, therefore, generates a time series of 4420 daily abnormal gross returns to the 
upgrade or downgrade portfolio from January 1996 to June 2013.
To rule out the concern on the poor model of asset pricing—i.e., the newly introduced 
factors of operating profitability and investment in the Fama and French (2015) five-factor 
model might not be effective in the UK stock market and the momentum effect is also 
ignored (see, Barber et al. 2001; Brookfield et al. 2015)—we further estimate the CAPM, 
the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model, and the Carhart (1997) four-factor model:
where MOMt represents the daily return on a zero-investment factor-mimicking portfolio 
for price momentum7; other variables are as defined in Eq.  (2). In addition to parameter 
estimates of αp and βp generated in the single-factor regression, the three-factor regression 
yields parameter estimates of sp and hp, while the four-factor regression yields parameter 
estimates of sp, hp, and mp.
(2)
Rp,t − Rf ,t = 훼p + 훽p
(
Rm,t − Rf ,t
)
+ spSMBt + hpHMLt + rpRMWt + cpCMAt + 휀p,t,
(3)Rp,t − Rf ,t = 훼p + 훽p
(
Rm,t − Rf ,t
)
+ 휀p,t;
(4)Rp,t − Rf ,t = 훼p + 훽p
(
Rm,t − Rf ,t
)
+ spSMBt + hpHMLt + 휀p,t;
(5)Rp,t − Rf ,t = 훼p + 훽p
(
Rm,t − Rf ,t
)
+ spSMBt + hpHMLt + mpMOMt + 휀p,t,
6 Fama and French (2015, p. 1) argue that their five-factor model captures “the size, value, profitability, and 
investment patterns in average stock returns”. We construct the five factors in the UK stock market, strictly 
following Fama and French (Fama and French 1993, 2015).
7 We construct the momentum factor in the UK stock market, following Carhart (1997). For robustness 
purposes, we also estimate the CAPM, the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model, and the Carhart 
(1997) four-factor model, using the daily returns on market, size, value, and momentum obtained from the 
Xfi Centre for Finance and Investment at University of Exeter (see, Gregory et al. 2013). Our results remain 
qualitatively the same, which are not reported for the sake of brevity, but are available on request.
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3.3  Transaction costs
Timmermann and Granger (2004, p. 19) argue that return predictability “has to be seen in 
relation to the transaction costs of the asset. Predictable patterns only invalidate the EMH 
once they are large enough to cover the size of transaction costs.” Keim and Madhavan 
(1998) categorize transaction costs into explicit costs (e.g., brokerage commissions and 
taxes) and implicit costs (e.g., bid-ask spread and market impact of trading). Hudson et al. 
(1996) show that the total single-trip transaction costs in the UK for the most favored of 
investors is upward of 0.5%, including government stamp duty of 0.25%, negotiated bro-
kerage commission of 0.05% (soft commissions could be zero if alternative services are 
offered in lieu of cash), and bid-ask spread of 0.25%. Based on a relatively cautious esti-
mate of the average single-trip transaction costs in the UK for purchasing stocks at 0.75% 
and for short selling stocks at 1.5%,8 we further measure the corresponding average daily 
portfolio turnover multiplied by transaction costs in each rolling window.
Specifically, the daily turnover for the upgrade portfolio p on the trading date t is defined 
as the percentage of stocks in the portfolio as of the close of trading on date t − 1 that has 
been sold off as of the close of trading on date t. That is, following Barber et al. (2001), we 
measure the daily turnover as the percentage of the portfolio that has been turned over into 
some other set of stocks on date t. First, for each stock i in the portfolio p as of the close of 
trading on date t − 1, we calculate its fraction of the portfolio, Gi,t, at the end of trading on 
date t without accounting for portfolio rebalancing:
where, as before, Ri,t represents the daily return for the recommended stock i on date t; 
np,t−1 represents the number of revisions in the portfolio p as of the close of trading on date 
t − 1; and ωi,t−1 represents the weight of stock i in the portfolio p on date t − 1, that is, the 
market value of stock i as of the close of trading on date t − 1, divided by the aggregate 
market value of all stocks in the portfolio as of the close of trading on date t − 1.
Second, Gi,t is compared to the actual fraction, that is, stock i makes up of portfolio p 
as of the close of trading on date t, after accounting for any portfolio rebalancing. Finally, 
the change in the percentage holding of each stock on date t − 1 is summed, generating the 
portfolio turnover on date t, TURNp,t9:
(6)Gi,t = 휔i,t−1 ×
(
1 + Ri,t
)
∕
np,t−1∑
i=1
휔i,t−1 ×
(
1 + Ri,t
)
(7)TURNp,t =
np,t∑
i=1
||Gi,t − Fi,t||,
8 Barber et  al. (2001) report that the abnormal net returns are not significantly greater than zero after 
accounting for the average single-trip transaction costs of 0.65% in the US. Despite the lack of readily avail-
able data regarding short selling costs in the UK, we assume a short selling cost of 0.75%, according to 
Ellis and Thomas (2004) and Li et al. (2009).
9 We calculate the portfolio turnover accounting for both increase and decrease in stock weight. For 
example, we adjust the upgrade portfolio by buying new stocks with upward revisions and simulta-
neously selling existing stocks when their upward revisions are dropped or downgraded on a daily 
basis; the increase in stock weight equals to the decrease in stock weight at the portfolio level (see, Bar-
ber et  al. 2001). Therefore, the total portfolio turnover = 2 × the decrease (or increase) in stock weight: ∑np,t
i=1
��Gi,t − Fi,t�� = ∑np,ti=1 max
��
Gi,t − Fi,t
�
, 0
�
× 2.
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where np,t represents the number of revisions in the portfolio p as of the close of trading 
on date t; Gi,t represents the calculated weight of stock i in the portfolio p as of the close 
of trading on date t − 1 without accounting for portfolio rebalancing; and Fi,t represents the 
actual weight that stock i in the portfolio p at the end of trading on date t after any portfolio 
rebalancing.
Finally, in each rolling window, we calculate the abnormal net return as the abnormal 
gross return less the estimated single-trip transaction costs multiplied by the corresponding 
daily portfolio turnover10:
4  Empirical and simulated results
In this section, we focus on presenting the empirical and simulated results under the Fama 
and French (2015) five-factor model, though our results remain qualitatively unchanged 
under the CAPM, the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model, and the Carhart (1997) 
four-factor model. These results are not presented for the sake of brevity, but are available 
on request.
4.1  Time‑varying portfolio performance
4.1.1  Abnormal gross returns
Figure 1a illustrates the time-varying daily abnormal returns gross of transaction costs to 
the upgrade portfolio, along with the corresponding t-statistics. Overall, the upgrade port-
folio does not generate any significantly positive abnormal gross returns in any period of 
time, but generate significantly negative abnormal gross returns in several periods of time. 
Specifically, the abnormal gross returns initially fluctuate around zero, and then become 
significantly negative, at least at the 5% level, from August 2001 to July 2003, ranging 
from − 3.80 basis points to − 6.49 basis points. After that, the significantly negative abnor-
mal gross returns are also observed in two short periods of time: (1) from August 2006 
to January 2007, ranging from − 2.42 basis points to − 4.27 basis points; and (2) from 
August 2008 to November 2008, ranging from − 4.55 basis points to − 6.02 basis points. 
Our empirical results suggest that upgrades are generally valueless in the UK, as they could 
not generate significantly positive abnormal returns (even before transaction costs). There-
fore, from an investor’s perspective, it is unlikely to make profits by purchasing stocks with 
upward revisions in any period of time and, even worse, it is likely to suffer significant 
losses over some periods of time.
Figure  1b illustrates the time-varying daily abnormal returns gross of transaction 
costs to the downgrade portfolio, along with the corresponding t-statistics. Importantly, 
the downgrade portfolio generates significantly negative abnormal gross returns in sev-
eral periods of time, at least at the 5% level. For example, we find significantly negative 
abnormal gross returns, which range from − 3.50 basis points to − 6.40 basis points from 
(8)
Abnormal net return = Abnormal gross return
(
훼p
)
− single−trip transaction cos ts × TURNp,t.
10 The unreported daily turnover for the upgrade portfolio ranges from 1.41 to 1.83%, with an average of 
1.61% over the whole sample period; the average daily turnover for the downgrade portfolio ranges from 
1.37 to 1.89%, with an average of 1.63%, which is close to that reported in the US (see, Barber et al. 2001).
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April 2001 to January 2003, and range from − 3.45 basis points to − 8.59 basis points from 
March 2009 to June 2010. This suggests that, on average, downgrades have certain invest-
ment value and that it is likely for investors to make profits by short selling stocks with 
downward revisions over some periods of time (before transaction costs).
4.1.2  Abnormal net returns
Figures 2a, b illustrates the time-varying average daily abnormal returns net of transaction 
costs to the upgrade (downgrade) portfolio, along with the corresponding t-statistics. We 
find no significantly positive (negative) abnormal net returns to the upgrade (downgrade) 
portfolios in any period of time, suggesting that it is unlikely for investors to make prof-
its by purchasing (short selling) stocks with upward (downward) revisions after taking a 
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 1  The time-varying daily abnormal gross returns to the a upgrade and b downgrade portfolios and the 
corresponding t-statistics under the Fama and French (2015) five-factor model, using the whole sample of 
UK analyst recommendation revisions
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reasonable level of transaction costs into account, in line with Barber et al. (2001). There-
fore, the observed market inefficiencies disappear after transaction costs, that is, the signifi-
cantly negative abnormal gross returns to the downgrade portfolios in several periods of 
time, as illustrated in Fig. 1b, are actually not exploitable by investors.11
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Fig. 2  The time-varying daily abnormal net returns to the a upgrade and b downgrade portfolios and the 
corresponding t-statistics under the Fama and French (2015) five-factor model, using the whole sample of 
UK analyst recommendation revisions
11 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting that the transaction costs should be taken into account 
for both the portfolio and benchmarks when calculating the abnormal net return of the upgrade and down-
grade portfolios. Based on the gross Fama and French (2015) five factors in the UK, we further construct 
the tradable factors. Specifically, the net return of each tradable factor portfolio is measured as the gross 
return of the corresponding factor portfolio less the portfolio turnover multiplied by transaction costs. Fol-
lowing Novy-Marx and Velikov (2016), we rebalance the underlying portfolios for the Fama and French 
(2015) factors annually, at the end of every June. We then reestimate the abnormal net return to the upgrade 
or downgrade portfolio by regressing the net portfolio return (the gross portfolio return net of transaction 
costs) against the tradable Fama and French (2015) five factors. Our overall conclusions hold up fairly well; 
our results based on the tradable Fama and French (2015) five factors are not presented to save space, but 
are available on request.
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4.2  Alternative investment strategies
4.2.1  High‑ranking brokerage houses
A growing body of sell-side analyst research shows the existence of skill differences 
among sell-side analysts, and those sell-side analysts with higher reputation (or star sell-
side analysts) are more able to make more valuable stock recommendations (see, Stickel 
1995; Hong and Kubik 2003; Fang and Yasuda 2014; Kucheev et  al. 2017). Ljungqvist 
et al. (2009) argue that the ranking of sell-side analysts in the Institutional Investor annual 
poll is the most important driver of their career outcomes. If investors realize that an ana-
lyst provides them with wrong information on purpose, the damage to the analyst’s reputa-
tion would be immediate and long-lasting. Sell-side analysts, as repetitive players in the 
capital markets, obtain and accumulate their reputation capital, and invariably attempt to 
protect their reputation capital by reducing the probability of becoming involved with mis-
leading stock recommendations. As more prestigious brokerage houses are able to attract 
and employ star sell-side analysts, we expect analyst recommendation revisions made by 
high-ranking brokerage houses to be more valuable.12
Specifically, we construct two alternative upgrade and downgrade portfolios, using a 
subsample of 11,016 analyst recommendation revisions made exclusively by the top 5 bro-
kerage houses, identified by their 3-year moving average (t − 3, t − 2, t − 1) of positions on 
the annual All-Europe Research Team published by Institutional Investor (see details in 
“Appendix 1”). Repeating all empirical analyses in Sect. 4.1, we find quite similar results 
to those using the whole sample. For example, Figs. 3a and 4a show that the upgrade port-
folio fails to generate any significantly positive abnormal gross (net) returns in any period 
of time before (after) transaction costs. Figure 3b shows that the downgrade portfolio gen-
erates significantly negative abnormal gross returns, at least at the 5% level, which range 
from − 3.74 basis points to − 8.57 basis points from January 2001 to March 2003, and 
range from − 3.79 basis points to − 8.68 basis points from December 2008 to March 2010. 
However, these observed significantly negative abnormal returns to the downgrade portfo-
lio disappear after transaction costs (see Fig. 4b).
Overall, we conclude that the reputation of brokerage houses does not play an 
important role in making valuable upward and downward revisions in the UK. That is, 
it is unlikely for investors to make profits (after transaction costs) by following analyst 
recommendation revisions in the UK, irrespective of whether they are made by high-
ranking brokerage houses or not. This seems different from that reported in the US, but 
the discrepancy could be explained by the less influence of the annual All-European 
Research Team published by Institutional Investor on UK sell-side analysts’ career 
concern, compared with the influence of its US counterpart.
12 The Morningstar database does  ide information on individual sell-side analysts issuing stock recom-
mendations, so we focus on the reputation of brokerage houses, which is supposed to be positively corre-
lated with the reputation of individual sell-side analysts (see Brown et al. 2009).
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4.2.2  Industry‑based investment strategies
Prior sell-side analyst research emphasizes the importance of controlling for various firm-
specific characteristics of the recommended stocks, e.g., size, value, trading volume, price 
momentum, earnings, and so on (see, Stickel 1995; Womack 1996; Jegadeesh et al. 2004; 
Anderson et al. 2017). Little attention has been paid to industry, though it has been well 
demonstrated to have predictive value for stock returns (see, Markowitz and Grinblatt 
1999; Boni and Womack 2006). In this subsection, we conduct an industry-based analysis 
to assess whether analyst recommendation revisions for stocks within specific industry sec-
tors in the UK can make large enough profits to cover the size of transaction costs.
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Fig. 3  The time-varying daily abnormal gross returns to the a upgrade and b downgrade portfolios and the 
corresponding t-statistics under the Fama and French (2015) five-factor model, using the subsample of UK 
analyst recommendation revisions made by the top 5 brokerage houses
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Overall, we find no significantly positive abnormal net returns to the upgrade portfo-
lio within any industry sector in any period of time, again suggesting that upgrades have 
no investment value in the UK, consistent with our early results (see Figs. 2a, 4a). How-
ever, we find some important evidence showing significantly negative abnormal net returns 
to the downgrade portfolio over some periods of time within two high-tech industry sec-
tors, i.e., Health Care (ICB 45) and Technology (ICB 95) sectors. In this subsection, we 
focus on presenting the time-varying daily abnormal net returns to the downgrade port-
folios within Health Care and Technology sectors. The insignificantly positive (negative) 
abnormal returns to the upgrade (downgrade) portfolio within other industry sectors are 
not reported to save space, but are available on request.
Figure 5a, b illustrates the time-varying daily abnormal net returns to the downgrade 
portfolio, along with the corresponding t-statistics, within Health Care and Technol-
ogy sectors, respectively. Specifically, Fig. 5a shows that, within Health Care sector, the 
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Fig. 4  The time-varying daily abnormal net returns to the a upgrade and b downgrade portfolios and the 
corresponding t-statistics under the Fama and French (2015) five-factor model, using the subsample of UK 
analyst recommendation revisions made by the top 5 brokerage houses
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downgrade portfolio generates significantly negative abnormal net returns, at least at the 
5% level, in several periods of time. For example, the significantly negative abnormal net 
returns range from − 1.94 basis points to − 2.73 basis points from July 1996 to September 
1997, range from − 2.51 basis points to − 4.47 basis points from August 2001 to August 
2003, and range from − 2.58 basis points to − 5.61 basis points from August 2007 to 
August 2009. Similarly, within Technology sector, the significantly negative abnormal net 
returns to the downgrade portfolio are observed in several periods of time, at least at the 
5% level (see Fig. 5b). For example, the significantly negative abnormal net returns range 
from − 3.21 basis points to − 6.44 basis points from September 2001 to March 2003, and 
range from − 2.44 basis points to − 7.45 basis points from December 2006 to May 2010.
These negative abnormal net returns to the downgrade portfolio within the two industry 
sectors are not only statistically significant, but also economically meaningful, suggesting 
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Fig. 5  The time-varying daily abnormal net returns to the downgrade portfolio and the corresponding t-sta-
tistics under the Fama and French (2015) five-factor model, within a Health Care (ICB 45) sector and b 
Technology (ICB 95) sector
 C. Su et al.
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the importance of controlling for the industry effect. From an investor’s perspective, it 
is likely to make profits by short selling stocks with downward revisions with high-tech 
related characteristics over some periods of time, even after transaction costs, though 
upward revisions are valueless in any industry sector. Our results confirm that short signals 
are more valuable than long signals (see, e.g., Barber et al. 2001; Jegadeesh et al. 2004; 
Ryan and Taffler 2006).13
Furthermore, our results could be mainly attributed to the greater coverage and efforts 
made by sell-side analysts on high-tech firms (Barth et al. 2001; Barron et al. 2002; Hir-
shleifer et  al. 2018). More specifically, high-tech firms have more unrecognized intangi-
ble assets, which reflect greater economic benefits from knowledge-based activities in the 
future. These high-tech firms, therefore, attract more attention from investment community 
and enjoy greater coverage; analyst coverage, in turn, improves the efficiency of communi-
cating private information to investors (see, Barron et al. 2002; Sun 2011).
Given that intangible assets are typically unrecognized in the financial statements, high-
tech firms are associated with more complex information, which provides opportunities for 
sell-side analysts to benefit from the application of their expertise (Barth et al. 2001; Bar-
ron et al. 2002; Hirshleifer et al. 2018). Sell-side analysts, therefore, expend more intense 
efforts to cover high-tech firms. In particular, the rapid development of the Internet has 
greatly enhanced the accessibility of various information, helping sell-side analysts make 
more valuable recommendations for stocks with high-tech related characteristics (Kwon 
2002). Also, Gu and Wang (2005) argue that information complexity may vary by the regu-
latory environment. Specifically, less complex information is related to firms within Health 
Care sector, e.g., biotech and pharmaceutical firms and firms manufacturing equipment 
used in medical treatment, due to the highly stringent and comprehensive regulations in the 
approval process of new drugs and new medical equipment. The transparency in the inno-
vation process thus improves sell-side analysts’ abilities in making valuable stock recom-
mendations within Health Care sector.
4.3  Bootstrapping simulations
Our empirical results in Sects. 4.1 and 4.2 not only provide important evidence to supple-
ment the financial literature, but also have significant implications for market participants. 
A natural question to ask is whether the reported abnormal returns are as a result of sell-
side analysts’ skill or their luck (Fama 1998; Barber et al. 2001). To address this concern, 
we develop a time-series bootstrapping simulation method to distinguish sell-side analysts’ 
luck from their skill. In this subsection, our simulated results mirror the three main parts 
of our empirical results. We focus on presenting the distribution of the t-statistics of the 
abnormal returns rather than the actual abnormal returns, as the t-statistic scales the abnor-
mal return by its standard errors and thus has superior statistical properties (see, Fama and 
French 2010). Specifically, we compare the values of the t-statistics at selected percen-
tiles of cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the actual t-statistics with the averages 
13 In general, investors are more likely to purchase stocks following positive recommendations, as it is 
more expensive to short sell (see, Irvine 2004; Jackson 2005; Mehran and Stulz 2007). As a result, in order 
to benefit from more trading, brokerage houses could make positively biased recommendations for stocks 
that actually do not have real investment value. By acting this way in the long term, brokerage houses and 
their analysts will lose their credibility as investors tend to discount the value of positive recommendations, 
causing long signals to be less valuable.
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Table 4  Percentiles of t-statistics for actual and simulated abnormal returns under the Fama and French 
(2015) five-factor model, using the whole sample of UK sell-side analyst recommendation revisions
% Upgrade portfolio Downgrade portfolio
Simulated 
t-stat
Actual 
t-stat
% (simulated 
< actual)
Simulated 
t-stat
Actual 
t-stat
% (simulated 
< actual)
Panel A: abnormal gross returns
 1 − 2.47 − 3.27 1.93 − 2.76 − 3.11 0.16
 2 − 2.06 − 2.85 2.24 − 2.35 − 2.77 0.31
 3 − 1.87 − 2.62 2.93 − 2.08 − 2.51 0.71
 4 − 1.75 − 2.46 2.94 − 1.93 − 2.35 0.70
 5 − 1.64 − 2.34 3.02 − 1.78 − 2.21 1.39
 10 − 1.27 − 1.88 3.24 − 1.35 − 1.81 1.69
 20 − 0.83 − 1.37 6.85 − 0.87 − 1.27 2.22
 30 − 0.52 − 1.01 9.88 − 0.50 − 0.85 3.61
 40 − 0.25 − 0.67 14.45 − 0.21 − 0.51 5.46
 50 − 0.01 − 0.41 18.62 0.05 − 0.20 8.98
 60 0.24 − 0.15 23.35 0.26 0.11 12.17
 70 0.50 0.14 30.80 0.45 0.37 15.17
 80 0.81 0.53 36.74 0.65 0.64 28.70
 90 1.25 1.01 37.04 0.87 0.95 57.47
 95 1.61 1.42 39.58 1.07 1.23 69.75
 96 1.72 1.53 40.82 1.13 1.35 77.19
 97 1.84 1.67 41.28 1.23 1.48 85.27
 98 2.02 1.82 42.42 1.38 1.78 92.63
 99 2.32 1.95 43.56 1.79 1.92 95.30
Panel B: abnormal net returns
 1 − 2.97 − 3.71 0.03 − 0.94 − 1.22 0.06
 2 − 2.56 − 3.32 0.04 − 0.75 − 1.04 0.11
 3 − 2.37 − 2.98 0.05 − 0.65 − 0.95 0.27
 4 − 2.25 − 2.81 0.06 − 0.58 − 0.90 0.27
 5 − 2.14 − 2.67 0.06 − 0.52 − 0.85 0.52
 10 − 1.77 − 2.18 0.07 − 0.32 − 0.67 0.64
 20 − 1.33 − 1.73 0.08 − 0.08 − 0.41 0.83
 30 − 1.02 − 1.46 0.12 0.10 − 0.19 1.37
 40 − 0.75 − 1.25 0.30 0.26 − 0.01 2.07
 50 − 0.53 − 1.04 0.69 0.40 0.14 3.40
 60 − 0.33 − 0.85 2.80 0.52 0.28 4.60
 70 − 0.13 − 0.62 3.26 0.65 0.43 5.73
 80 0.11 − 0.37 5.60 0.78 0.58 10.85
 90 0.55 − 0.03 9.56 0.97 0.75 21.72
 95 0.98 0.03 12.54 1.15 0.87 26.36
 96 1.12 0.12 24.73 1.21 0.91 29.17
 97 1.30 0.22 27.06 1.28 0.96 36.09
 98 1.52 0.38 31.23 1.45 1.05 37.63
 99 1.82 0.64 35.35 1.79 1.13 38.96
 C. Su et al.
1 3
of the 5000 simulated t-statistics at the same percentiles. If the actual t-statistics is higher 
than 95% of the 5000 simulated t-statistics, we reject the null hypothesis that the abnormal 
return is due to random chance (sell-side analysts’ luck) at the 95% confidence level and 
vice versa.
4.3.1  Simulated results based on the whole sample
Table 4 shows the CDFs of the actual t-statistics of the abnormal returns (both gross and 
net of transaction costs) and the average of the simulated CDFs for the upgrade and down-
grade portfolios, based on the whole sample. The left side of Panel A shows that for the 
upgrade portfolio, the actual t-statistics of the abnormal gross returns are always smaller 
than the corresponding average values from the simulations for all percentiles. For exam-
ple, the left tail 5th and 10th percentiles of the actual t-statistics are − 2.34 and − 1.88, 
respectively, smaller than the corresponding average values of − 1.64 and − 1.27 from 
the simulations. Similarly, the right tail 90th and 95th percentiles of the actual t-statistics 
are 1.01 and 1.42, respectively, smaller than the average values of 1.25 and 1.61 from the 
simulations. The simulated results clearly suggest sell-side analysts’ lack of skill in mak-
ing valuable upward revisions for stocks that can generate significantly positive abnormal 
returns (even before transaction costs). It is not surprising that, in the left side of Panel B, 
for the upgrade portfolio, the actual t-statistics of the abnormal net returns are far below 
the average values from the simulations for all percentiles, again confirming that sell-side 
analysts do not possess sufficient skill in making valuable upward revisions in any period 
of time. Figure 6a, b illustrates the CDFs of the actual t-statistics of the abnormal gross 
(net) returns and the corresponding average simulated CDFs for the upgrade portfolio.
The right side of Panel A shows that for the downgrade portfolio, the left tail percen-
tiles of the actual t-statistics of the abnormal gross returns are far below the correspond-
ing average values from the simulations. For example, the 5th and 10th percentiles of the 
actual t-statistics are − 2.21 and − 1.81, respectively, much lower than the average values of 
− 1.78 and − 1.35 from the simulations. In contrast, the right tail percentiles of the actual 
t-statistics suggest that sell-side analysts have certain skill in making valuable downward 
revisions over some periods of time (at least before transaction costs). For example, the 
90th and 95th percentiles of the actual t-statistics are 0.95 and 1.23, respectively, higher 
than the average values of 0.87 and 1.07 from the simulations. However, the observed supe-
rior skill does not show up more generally in the abnormal net returns as they are absorbed 
by transaction costs. Specifically, the right side of Panel B shows that for the downgrade 
portfolio, the actual t-statistics of the abnormal net returns are always smaller than the cor-
responding average values from the simulations for all percentiles, suggesting sell-side 
analysts’ lack of enough skill in making valuable downward revisions for stocks that can 
generate significant abnormal returns to cover the size of transaction costs in any period of 
Table 4  (continued)
This table presents the values of t-statistics at selected percentiles (%) of the distribution of t-statistics 
of the actual and simulated abnormal returns, as well as the percentage of the 5000 simulation runs that 
produce lower values of t-statistics at the selected percentiles than those actual abnormal returns (% simu-
lated < actual) for the upgrade and downgrade portfolios, using the whole sample of UK analyst recommen-
dation revisions from January 1996 to June 2013. The abnormal gross return is estimated as the intercept 
term derived from the Fama and French (2015) five-factor model. The abnormal net return is calculated as 
the abnormal gross return less the estimated single-trip transaction costs for purchasing stocks at 0.75% and 
for short selling those at 1.5%, multiplied by the corresponding average daily portfolio turnover
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time. Figure 7a, b illustrates the CDFs of the actual t-statistics of the abnormal gross (net) 
returns and the corresponding average simulated CDFs for the downgrade portfolio.
4.3.2  Simulated results based on the subsample made by the top 5 brokerage houses
We turn now to simulations that use the subsample of analyst recommendation revisions 
made by the top 5 brokerage houses. Table 5 shows that our subsample simulated results 
are qualitatively similar to those based on the whole sample, as shown in Table 4, con-
firming that the reputation of brokerage houses does not matter. That is, on average, even 
sell-side analysts working for high-ranking brokerage houses have no enough skill to make 
valuable upward or downward revisions for stocks that can produce abnormal returns to 
offset the size of transaction costs in any period of time.
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Fig. 6  Simulated and actual cumulative density function (CDF) of t-statistics for the abnormal a gross 
returns and b net returns to the upgrade portfolio, under the Fama and French (2015) five-factor model, 
using the whole sample
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4.3.3  Simulated results within two high‑tech industry sectors
Finally, our early results in Fig. 5a, b imply that it is likely for investors to make profits 
after transaction costs, by short selling stocks with downward revisions, within two high-
tech industry sectors, i.e., Health Care (ICB 45) and Technology (ICB 95) sectors, respec-
tively. Table 6 reports the CDFs of the actual t-statistics of the abnormal net returns and the 
average of the simulated CDFs for the upgrade and downgrade portfolios, within the two 
high-tech industry sectors.14 Specifically, the left side of Panels A and B of Table 6 shows 
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Fig. 7  Simulated and actual cumulative density function (CDF) of t-statistics for the abnormal a gross 
returns and b net returns to the downgrade portfolio, under the Fama and French (2015) five-factor model, 
using the whole sample
14 We also conduct bootstrapping simulations within other industry sectors, showing that sell-side analysts 
do not possess sufficient skill in making valuable upward or downward revisions over the whole sample 
period, the results of which are not reported for the sake of brevity, but are available on request.
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Table 5  Percentiles of t-statistics for actual and simulated abnormal returns under the Fama and French 
(2015) five-factor model, using the subsample of UK sell-side analyst recommendation revisions made by 
the top 5 brokerage houses
% Upgrade portfolio Downgrade portfolio
Simulated  
t-stat
Actual  
t-stat
% (simulated  
< actual)
Simulated  
t-stat
Actual  
t-stat
% (simulated  
< actual)
Panel A: abnormal gross returns
 1 − 2.63 − 3.26 1.74 − 2.67 − 3.04 0.15
 2 − 2.10 − 2.83 2.27 − 2.22 − 2.62 0.29
 3 − 1.88 − 2.61 2.37 − 1.98 − 2.44 0.68
 4 − 1.72 − 2.46 2.64 − 1.83 − 2.30 0.67
 5 − 1.62 − 2.34 2.65 − 1.73 − 2.00 1.33
 10 − 1.26 − 1.93 3.10 − 1.38 − 1.36 1.62
 20 − 0.85 − 1.42 6.21 − 0.88 − 1.09 2.12
 30 − 0.54 − 1.06 9.34 − 0.53 − 0.66 3.47
 40 − 0.26 − 0.74 10.93 − 0.21 − 0.25 5.25
 50 − 0.01 − 0.48 13.42 0.05 0.12 8.65
 60 0.24 − 0.20 17.05 0.30 0.45 11.74
 70 0.52 0.11 22.49 0.47 0.65 14.66
 80 0.85 0.46 26.53 0.69 1.03 27.78
 90 1.27 0.98 31.69 0.99 1.47 55.72
 95 1.59 1.40 34.39 1.25 1.62 67.74
 96 1.70 1.52 35.29 1.34 1.75 75.09
 97 1.84 1.66 36.30 1.48 1.78 83.10
 98 2.11 1.88 37.54 1.67 1.88 92.33
 99 2.64 1.92 38.27 1.88 1.94 95.32
Panel B: abnormal net returns
 1 − 2.70 − 3.74 0.02 − 1.21 − 1.40 0.06
 2 − 2.16 − 3.35 0.04 − 0.85 − 1.31 0.11
 3 − 1.94 − 3.12 0.04 − 0.71 − 1.08 0.27
 4 − 1.77 − 2.98 0.05 − 0.66 − 0.94 0.26
 5 − 1.66 − 2.85 0.05 − 0.55 − 0.84 0.51
 10 − 1.29 − 1.89 0.06 − 0.39 − 0.80 0.62
 20 − 0.87 − 1.50 0.08 − 0.08 − 0.76 0.82
 30 − 0.55 − 1.40 0.09 0.03 − 0.52 1.34
 40 − 0.27 − 1.05 0.19 0.22 − 0.30 2.04
 50 − 0.01 − 0.80 0.50 0.46 − 0.07 3.35
 60 0.25 − 0.67 2.14 0.54 0.11 4.55
 70 0.53 − 0.47 2.78 0.79 0.26 5.68
 80 0.87 − 0.24 4.51 0.91 0.48 10.78
 90 1.30 − 0.02 8.18 1.03 0.57 21.65
 95 1.63 0.03 10.02 1.28 0.80 26.33
 96 1.74 0.11 17.03 1.37 0.86 29.20
 97 1.89 0.26 21.81 1.52 0.93 36.21
 98 1.93 0.36 25.60 1.62 1.12 37.85
 99 1.95 0.71 28.15 1.82 1.31 39.27
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that, for the upgrade portfolio, the actual t-statistics are always smaller than the average 
values from the simulations for all percentiles within both industry sectors, suggesting sell-
side analysts’ lack of skill in making valuable upward revisions over the whole sample 
period.
In contrast, for the downgrade portfolio within Health Care sector, the right tails of the 
CDFs of the actual t-statistics suggest that there are superior sell-side analysts who can 
make valuable downgrades after transaction costs over some periods of time. For example, 
the right side of Panel A shows that the CDF of the actual t-statistics of the abnormal net 
returns moves to the right tail of the average from the simulations at about the 80th per-
centile. The 95th percentile of t-statistics averages 0.79 for the simulations, but the actual 
95th percentile of t-statistics is higher, 1.24. Similarly, for the downgrade portfolio within 
Technology sector, the crossover occurs at the higher percentile (around the 70th), suggest-
ing that sell-side analysts do possess sufficient skill in making valuable downgrades for 
stocks with high-tech related characteristics over some periods of time, even after transac-
tion costs. Figures 8a, b illustrate the CDFs of the actual t-statistics of the abnormal net 
returns and the corresponding average simulated CDFs for the downgrade portfolio, within 
the industry sector of Health Care (Technology).
5  Conclusions
The purpose of this inquiry is to conduct an in-depth investigation into the investment 
value of sell-side analyst recommendation revisions in the UK from January 1995 to June 
2013, using a uniquely insightful database that has never been examined before. We take 
an investor-oriented, calendar-time perspective, to assess the time-varying performance of 
the upgrade and downgrade portfolios. Our empirical investigation shows that, on aver-
age, sell-side analysts’ upward revisions are valueless over the whole sample period; it is 
likely for investors to make profits by short selling stocks with downward revisions (before 
transaction costs) over some periods of time, while these profits disappear after transac-
tion costs. Our results do not alter when we construct two alternative upgrade and down-
grade portfolios exclusively using a subsample of analyst recommendation revisions made 
by the top 5 brokerage houses. This suggests that the reputation of brokerage houses does 
not play an important role in making valuable analyst recommendation revisions in the 
Table 5  (continued)
This table presents the values of t-statistics at selected percentiles (%) of the distribution of t-statistics 
of the actual and simulated abnormal returns, as well as the percentage of the 5000 simulation runs that 
produce lower values of t-statistics at the selected percentiles than those actual abnormal returns (% simu-
lated < actual) for the upgrade and downgrade portfolios, using the subsample of UK sell-side analyst rec-
ommendation revisions made by the top 5 brokerage houses from January 1996 to June 2013. The abnormal 
gross return is estimated as the intercept term derived from the Fama and French (2015) five-factor model. 
The abnormal net return is calculated as the abnormal gross return less the estimated single-trip transaction 
costs for purchasing stocks at 0.75% and for short selling those at 1.5%, multiplied by the corresponding 
average daily portfolio turnover. The top 5 brokerage houses are identified by their 3-year moving average 
(t − 3, t − 2, t − 1) of positions on the annual All-Europe Research Team published by Institutional Investor 
(see “Appendix 1”)
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Table 6  Percentiles of t-statistics for actual and simulated abnormal net returns under the Fama and French 
(2015) five-factor model, within two industry sectors of Health Care (ICB 45) and Technology (ICB 95)
% Upgrade portfolio Downgrade portfolio
Simulated 
t-stat
Actual 
t-stat
% (simulated 
< actual)
Simulated  
t-stat
Actual 
t-stat
% (simulated 
< actual)
Panel A: abnormal net returns within Health Care (ICB 45) sector
 1 − 2.49 − 3.69 0.03 − 2.68 − 3.41 3.19
 2 − 2.17 − 3.36 0.04 − 2.23 − 2.98 3.01
 3 − 1.98 − 3.13 0.06 − 1.95 − 2.72 3.42
 4 − 1.84 − 3.00 0.06 − 1.78 − 2.51 4.16
 5 − 1.73 − 2.87 0.06 − 1.68 − 2.39 5.19
 10 − 1.35 − 2.54 0.06 − 1.38 − 1.89 8.53
 20 − 0.88 − 2.01 0.07 − 1.03 − 1.45 11.69
 30 − 0.55 − 1.58 0.09 − 0.77 − 1.15 21.29
 40 − 0.26 − 1.20 0.11 − 0.57 − 0.93 27.31
 50 0.01 − 0.87 0.12 − 0.41 − 0.71 35.14
 60 0.27 − 0.51 0.17 − 0.26 − 0.51 43.22
 70 0.57 − 0.18 0.21 − 0.11 − 0.28 54.26
 80 0.91 0.19 0.39 0.08 0.01 60.28
 90 1.38 0.88 6.10 0.41 0.56 74.62
 95 1.77 1.35 12.08 0.79 1.24 80.30
 96 1.89 1.49 14.54 0.93 1.38 84.60
 97 2.03 1.61 16.00 1.10 1.61 87.67
 98 2.22 1.81 24.02 1.36 1.89 93.82
 99 2.52 1.87 34.64 1.81 1.92 95.46
Panel B: abnormal net returns within Technology (ICB 95) sector
 1 − 3.07 − 3.73 0.06 − 2.69 − 3.30 1.74
 2 − 2.50 − 3.42 0.07 − 2.25 − 2.64 4.36
 3 − 2.20 − 3.17 0.08 − 1.98 − 2.39 4.55
 4 − 2.05 − 2.90 0.10 − 1.81 − 2.22 6.46
 5 − 1.93 − 2.71 0.10 − 1.69 − 2.11 7.12
 10 − 1.48 − 2.17 0.11 − 1.39 − 1.73 7.70
 20 − 0.99 − 1.69 0.13 − 1.15 − 1.35 8.77
 30 − 0.62 − 1.32 0.16 − 1.06 − 1.20 9.65
 40 − 0.30 − 1.03 0.22 − 1.02 − 1.12 14.12
 50 − 0.01 − 0.75 0.25 − 1.01 − 1.07 16.48
 60 0.29 − 0.46 0.30 − 0.99 − 1.03 25.75
 70 0.57 − 0.13 0.31 − 0.98 − 0.98 54.93
 80 0.91 0.29 0.62 − 0.95 − 0.88 56.24
 90 1.38 0.90 5.02 − 0.85 − 0.73 66.68
 95 1.79 1.33 8.14 − 0.73 − 0.60 73.57
 96 1.90 1.44 10.40 − 0.69 − 0.55 78.85
 97 2.04 1.62 12.31 − 0.61 − 0.47 85.59
 98 2.24 1.82 14.79 − 0.47 − 0.32 92.15
 99 2.75 1.84 24.27 − 0.15 − 0.05 96.24
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Table 6  (continued)
This table presents the values of t-statistics at selected percentiles (%) of the distribution of t-statistics of the 
actual and simulated abnormal returns, as well as the percentage of the 5000 simulation runs that produce 
lower values of t-statistics at the selected percentiles than those actual abnormal returns for the upgrade 
and downgrade portfolios, using the subsample of UK sell-side analyst recommendation revisions within 
two high-tech industry sectors, i.e., Health Care (ICB 45 in Panel A) and Technology (ICB 95 in Panel B) 
sectors, identified by the two-digit ICB codes (see “Appendix 2”), from January 1996 to June 2013. The 
abnormal net return is calculated as the abnormal gross return, which is estimated as the intercept term 
derived from the Fama and French (2015) five-factor model, less the estimated single-trip transaction costs 
for purchasing stocks at 0.75% and for short selling those at 1.5%, multiplied by the corresponding average 
daily portfolio turnover
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Fig. 8  Simulated and actual cumulative density function (CDF) of t-statistics for the abnormal net returns to 
the downgrade portfolio, under the Fama and French (2015) five-factor model, within a Health Care (ICB 
45) sector and b Technology (ICB 95) sector
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UK, inconsistent with that reported in the US. One possible explanation on the discrepancy 
could be that the annual All-European Research Team published by Institutional Investor 
has less influence on UK sell-side analysts’ career concern, compared with the influence of 
its US counterpart. Further research might focus on the development of more appropriate 
proxies for the reputation of brokerage houses and sell-side analysts in the UK (see, e.g., 
Nolte et al. 2014).
However, our industry-based analysis shows that, within two high-tech industry sectors, 
i.e., Health Care (ICB 45) and Technology (ICB 95) sectors, the downgrade portfolio gen-
erates significantly negative abnormal net returns in several periods of time. These signifi-
cantly negative abnormal net returns suggest the importance of controlling for industry in 
sell-side analyst research. From an investor’s perspective, it is likely to make large enough 
profits to cover the size of transaction costs by short selling stocks with downward revi-
sions with high-tech related characteristics over some periods of time.
Our time-series bootstrapping simulations confirm that, on average, (1) the observed 
insignificantly positive abnormal returns (both gross and net of transaction costs) to the 
upgrade portfolio could be attributed to sell-side analysts’ lack of skill in making valuable 
upward revisions, rather than their bad luck; and (2) sell-side analysts have certain skill in 
making valuable downward revisions over some periods of time (at least before transac-
tion costs), though such skill is not sufficient to cover the size of transaction costs. More 
importantly, our simulated results confirm that sell-side analysts do possess superior skill 
in making valuable downward revisions for stocks with high-tech related characteristics, 
even after transaction costs are taken into account.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that there is some slight differences between the invest-
ment value and profitability of sell-side analyst recommendations.15 On the one hand, ana-
lyst recommendations could be worthless, but the portfolio might be profitable. For exam-
ple, Green (2006) reports that early access to stock recommendations provides investors 
with incremental investment value, which could be attributed to the existence of momentum 
traders in the market (Hong and Stein 1999). These momentum traders have a tendency to 
exchange aggressively and deviate a stock’s price beyond its fundamental value, thus lead-
ing to a market overreaction in the short term. On the other hand, analyst recommendations 
are in fact valuable, but the portfolio might end up not being profitable, probably due to the 
crowd effect when the information is widely and publicly broadcast. According to Hong 
and Stein (1999), the market firstly underreacts to the release of analyst recommendations, 
as news watchers tend to react to information with a delay. The initial underreaction is gen-
erally followed by overreaction, since investors may chase fad, which drives stock prices 
overshoot their long-term equilibrium, and eventually causes the portfolio not profitable in 
the long term. In this manner, the key implication of the Hong and Stein (1999) model on 
sell-side analyst research is the speed of reaction to stock recommendations (Green 2006; 
Jegadeesh and Kim 2006), which could be left for future research.
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Appendix 1: The top 5 brokerage houses
Ranking Brokerage houses Ranking Brokerage houses
1996 1997
 1 SBC Warburg Securities (1, 1, 1)  1 SBC Warburg (1, 1, 1)
 2 James Capel and Co. (2, 2, 2)  2 James Capel and Co. (2, 2, 2)
 3 Barclays de Zoete Wedd (BZW) (4, 3, 3)  3 BZW (3, 3, 6)
 4 NatWest Securities (5, 5, 5)  4 NatWest Securities (5, 5, 5)
 5 UBS (2, 6, 8)  5 UBS (6, 8, 3)
1998 1999
 1 SBC Warburg Dillion Read (1, 1, 1)  1 Warburg Dillion Read (1, 1, 1)
 2 HSBC James Capel (2, 2, 5)  2 UBS (3, 2, 3)
 3 UBS (8, 3, 2)  3 Merrill Lynch (4, 3, 2)
 4 NatWest Securities (5, 5, 4)  4 NatWest Securities (5, 4, 4)
 5 BZM (3, 6, 6)  5 HSBC James Capel (2, 5, 9)
2000 2001
 1 Warburg Dillion Read (1, 1, 2)  1 Merrill Lynch (2, 1, 1)
 2 Merrill Lynch (3, 2, 1)  2 Warburg Dillon Read (1, 2, 3)
 3 Goldman Sachs International (7, 5, 4)  3 Goldman Sachs International (5, 4, 6)
 4 HSBC Securities (5, 9, 8)  4 Morgan Stanley Dean Witter (11, 3, 2)
 5 Morgan Stanley Dean Witter (9, 11, 3)  5 Credit Suisse First Boston (12, 6, 4); 
Deutsche Bank (9, 8, 5)
2002 2003
 1 Merrill Lynch (1, 1, 2)  1 Credit Suisse First Boston (4, 1, 2)
 2 UBS Warburg (2, 3, 4)  2 UBS Warburg (3, 4, 1)
 3 Morgan Stanley Dean Witter (3, 2, 5)  2 Merrill Lynch (1, 2, 5)
 4 Credit Suisse First Boston (6, 4, 1)  4 Deutsche Bank (5, 3, 3)
 5 Deutsche Bank (8, 5, 3)  5 Morgan Stanley (2, 5, 6)
2004 2005
 1 UBS Warburg (4, 1, 1)  1 UBS (1, 1, 1)
 2 Credit Suisse First Boston (1, 2, 4)  2 Smith Barney Citigroup (4, 2, 2)
 3 Deutsche Bank (3, 3, 3)  3 Credit Suisse First Boston (2, 4, 3)
 4 Citigroup/Schroder Salomon Smith 
Barney (6, 4, 2)
 4 Deutsche Bank (3, 3, 5)
 4 Merrill Lynch (2, 5, 5)  5 Merrill Lynch (5, 5, 3)
2006 2007
 1 UBS (1, 1, 1)  1 UBS (1, 1, 1)
 2 Smith Barney Citigroup (2, 2, 4)  2 Citigroup (2, 4, 2)
 3 Deutsche Bank (3, 5, 2)  3 Deutsche Bank (5, 2, 3)
 4 Merrill Lynch (5, 3, 3)  4 Merrill Lynch (3, 3, 5)
 5 Credit Suisse First Boston (4, 3, 6)  5 Credit Suisse (3, 6, 5)
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Ranking Brokerage houses Ranking Brokerage houses
2008 2009
 1 UBS (1, 1, 1)  1 UBS (1, 1, 1)
 2 Citigroup (4, 2, 2)  2 Citi Investment Research (2, 2, 2)
 3 Deutsche Bank (2, 3, 5)  3 Merrill Lynch (5, 3, 3)
 4 Merrill Lynch (3, 5, 3)  4 Credit Suisse (5, 4, 4)
 5 Credit Suisse (6, 5, 4)  5 Deutsche Bank (3, 5, 7)
2010 2011
 1 UBS (1, 1, 1)  1 UBS (1, 1, 1)
 2 Citi (2, 2, 3)  2 BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research (3, 
2, 5)
 3 Bank of America Securities-Merrill 
Lynch (3, 3, 2)
 2 Credit Suisse (4, 5, 2)
 4 Credit Suisse (4, 4, 5)  2 Citi (2, 3, 8)
 5 Morgan Stanley (7, 5, 5)  5 J.P. Morgan (8, 4, 2)
2012 2013
 1 UBS (1, 1, 2)  1 UBS (1, 2, 2)
 2 J.P. Morgan Cazenove (4, 2, 4)  2 Deutsche Bank (6, 1, 1)
 2 BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research 
(2, 5, 3)
 3 BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research (5, 
3, 2)
 4 Credit Suisse (5, 2, 4)  3 J.P. Morgan Cazenove (2, 4, 4)
 5 Deutsche Bank (7, 6, 1)  5 Credit Suisse (2, 4, 6)
This appendix provides a list of the top 5 brokerage houses based on their 3-year moving average of posi-
tions on the annual All-Europe Research Team published by Institutional Investor from 1996 to 2013. For 
each brokerage house in each year of t, its positions in previous 3 years (t − 3, t − 2, t − 1) are shown in 
bracket. For example, the ranking of each brokerage house in the calendar year of 1996 is determined based 
on its average position in the years of 1995, 1994, and 1993
Appendix 2: Distribution of UK analyst recommendation revisions 
in the upgrade and downgrade portfolios by industry sectors 
of the covered firms
Two-digit 
ICB codes
Three-digit 
ICB codes
Upgrade portfolio Downgrade portfolio
No. of 
covered 
firms
No. of 
broker-
age 
houses
Average 
rating
No. of 
upward 
revi-
sions
No. of 
covered 
firms
No. of 
broker-
age 
houses
Average 
rating
No. of 
down-
ward 
revisions
05 Oil and 
Gas
053 Oil and 
Gas Pro-
ducers
58 55 2.21 
[1.23]
746 66 59 6.10 
[3.66]
798
057 Oil 
Equipment, 
Services, 
and Distri-
bution
18 39 2.29 
[1.27]
269 18 41 5.73 
[3.44]
266
058 Alterna-
tive Energy
8 16 2.14 
[1.14]
35 5 14 5.32 
[3.20]
25
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Two-digit 
ICB codes
Three-digit 
ICB codes
Upgrade portfolio Downgrade portfolio
No. of 
covered 
firms
No. of 
broker-
age 
houses
Average 
rating
No. of 
upward 
revi-
sions
No. of 
covered 
firms
No. of 
broker-
age 
houses
Average 
rating
No. of 
down-
ward 
revisions
13 Chemi-
cals
135 Chemi-
cals
39 52 2.25 
[1.24]
701 40 54 5.69 
[3.44]
763
17 Basic 
Resources
173 Forestry 
and Paper
4 13 2.31 
[1.31]
32 4 15 6.07 
[3.67]
43
175 Industrial 
Metals and 
Mining
8 24 2.23 
[1.25]
53 11 31 6.51 
[3.96]
111
177 Mining 62 46 2.19 
[1.21]
536 57 47 5.99 
[3.62]
613
23 Construc-
tion and 
Materials
235 Con-
struction 
and Materi-
als
66 52 2.31 
[1.26]
929 64 57 5.98 
[3.61]
1022
27 Industrial 
Goods and 
Services
271 Aero-
space and 
Defence
17 49 2.30 
[1.28]
584 17 48 5.72 
[3.44]
514
272 General 
Industrials
18 44 2.23 
[1.25]
400 19 50 5.79 
[3.48]
492
273 Elec-
tronic and 
Electrical 
Equipment
66 46 2.30 
[1.27]
602 73 53 5.69 
[3.42]
691
275 Industrial 
Engineer-
ing
77 50 2.29 
[1.26]
976 83 57 5.67 
[3.41]
1053
277 Industrial 
Transporta-
tion
39 49 2.25 
[1.24]
489 42 54 5.87 
[3.55]
596
279 Support 
Services
221 67 2.25 
[1.24]
2757 236 73 5.85 
[3.53]
3019
33 Automo-
biles and 
Parts
335 Automo-
biles and 
Parts
14 34 2.28 
[1.26]
184 18 41 5.89 
[3.56]
245
35 Food and 
Beverage
353 Bever-
ages
14 42 2.27 
[1.25]
293 15 48 6.17 
[3.75]
415
357 Food 
Producers
46 46 2.24 
[1.25]
788 52 49 5.86 
[3.54]
981
37 Personal 
and 
Household 
Goods
372 House-
hold Goods 
and Home 
Construc-
tion
57 52 2.33 
[1.26]
962 62 56 5.94 
[3.59]
1105
374 Leisure 
Goods
16 29 2.33 
[1.25]
135 18 33 5.77 
[3.47]
158
376 Personal 
Goods
39 38 2.32 
[1.24]
260 46 43 5.66 
[3.42]
302
378 Tobacco 3 18 2.09 
[1.15]
94 3 19 5.91 
[3.58]
100
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Two-digit 
ICB codes
Three-digit 
ICB codes
Upgrade portfolio Downgrade portfolio
No. of 
covered 
firms
No. of 
broker-
age 
houses
Average 
rating
No. of 
upward 
revi-
sions
No. of 
covered 
firms
No. of 
broker-
age 
houses
Average 
rating
No. of 
down-
ward 
revisions
45 Health 
Care
453 Health 
Care Equip-
ment and 
Services
39 49 2.23 
[1.22]
392 46 52 5.72 
[3.44]
480
457 Pharma-
ceuticals 
and Bio-
technology
64 57 2.24 
[1.23]
556 68 57 5.91 
[3.57]
681
53 Retail 533 Food 
and Drug 
Retailers
20 51 2.25 
[1.24]
562 22 53 6.41 
[3.88]
906
537 General 
Retailers
110 63 2.28 
[1.25]
2220 121 68 6.14 
[3.71]
3099
55 Media 555 Media 130 65 2.22 
[1.22]
1252 139 64 5.73 
[3.46]
1375
57 Travel 
and Leisure
575 Travel 
and Leisure
143 66 2.20 
[1.19]
2462 149 69 5.88 
[3.55]
2944
65 Telecom-
munica-
tions
653 Fixed 
Line Tel-
ecommuni-
cations
21 47 2.14 
[1.16]
219 20 48 6.07 
[3.66]
274
657 Mobile 
Telecom-
munications
11 37 2.12 
[1.14]
99 13 33 5.82 
[3.53]
89
75 Utilities 753 Electric-
ity
13 35 2.16 
[1.19]
186 12 33 6.08 
[3.69]
247
757 Gas, 
Water, and 
Multiutili-
ties
19 35 2.22 
[1.24]
365 17 35 5.97 
[3.60]
419
83 Banks 835 Banks 14 48 2.23 
[1.23]
606 15 47 6.32 
[3.84]
806
85 Insurance 853 Nonlife 
Insurance
47 43 2.33 
[1.33]
701 47 46 5.81 
[3.50]
703
857 Life 
Insurance
13 36 2.24 
[1.23]
266 15 37 6.01 
[3.64]
296
87 Financial 
Services
873 Real 
Estate
85 47 2.30 
[1.30]
827 85 50 5.83 
[3.50]
875
877 General 
Financial
128 61 2.25 
[1.24]
1346 130 64 5.86 
[3.53]
1501
95 Technol-
ogy
953 Soft-
ware and 
Computer 
Services
169 66 2.19 
[1.18]
1356 189 69 5.94 
[3.59]
1764
957 Technol-
ogy Hard-
ware and 
Equipment
42 54 2.12 
[1.13]
461 44 54 6.10 
[3.69]
603
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Two-digit 
ICB codes
Three-digit 
ICB codes
Upgrade portfolio Downgrade portfolio
No. of 
covered 
firms
No. of 
broker-
age 
houses
Average 
rating
No. of 
upward 
revi-
sions
No. of 
covered 
firms
No. of 
broker-
age 
houses
Average 
rating
No. of 
down-
ward 
revisions
Overall 1958 111 2.25 
[1.24]
25,701 2081 109 5.93 
[3.58]
30,374
This appendix presents the distribution of 25,701 upward (30,374 downward) changes in analyst recommen-
dations in the upgrade (downgrade) portfolio from January 1993 to June 2013 by industry sectors of the 
recommended firms, in terms of the number of firms covered, the number of brokerage houses, as well as 
the average rating and number of analyst recommendation revisions. All real-time analyst recommendations 
are obtained from Morningstar Company Intelligence. A rating of 1 reflects a strong buy, 2 a buy, 3 a weak 
buy, 4 a weak buy/hold, 5 a hold, 6 a hold/sell, 7 a weak sell, 8 a sell, and 9 a strong sell, which are reclas-
sified into five categories: Strong Buy (1 and 2), Buy (3 and 4), Hold (5), Sell (6 and 7), and Strong Sell 
(8 and 9). An upgrade portfolio consists of all stocks with upward revisions to Strong buys or Buys from 
previous Strong Sells, Sells, or Holds, while a downgrade portfolio consists of all stocks with downward 
revisions to Strong Sells, Sells, or Holds from previous Strong Buys or Buys. We report the average rating 
for analyst recommendation revisions based on the nine-point rating scale, while in square brackets, we 
report the average rating based on the five-point rating scale
Appendix 3: Time‑series bootstrapping simulation method
This appendix illustrates the rolling window-based time-series bootstrapping simulation 
method with the Fama and French (2015) five-factor model, but the application of the 
bootstrapping procedure to the CAPM, the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model, 
and the Carhart (1997) four-factor model is very similar, with the only modification of the 
following steps being the substitution of appropriate asset pricing models   (see, Su and 
Zhang 2018).
First, in the first 1-year rolling window (January 3, 1995 to December 29, 1995), we 
estimate the Fama and French (2015) five-factor model to calculate the estimated alphas, 
factor loadings, and residuals using the time series of daily excess returns for the portfolio, {(
Rp,t − Rf ,t
)
, t = Tp,1,… , Tp,252
}
 , where Tp,1 and Tp,252 are the first and last trading dates, 
respectively, in the rolling window:
Second, we save the coefficient estimates, 
{
?̂?p, 𝛽p, ŝp, ĥp, r̂p, ĉp
}
 , the time series of esti-
mated residuals, 
{
?̂?p,t, t = Tp,1,… , Tp,252
}
 , and the t-statistic of alpha, t̂?̂?p.
Third, we generate a pseudo-time series of resampled residuals {
?̂?b
p,tb
, tb = T
b
p,1
,… , Tb
p,252
}
 by randomly drawing residuals from the saved residual vector {
?̂?p,t
}
 with replacements, where b is the bootstrapping simulation index. In the same way, 
we generate a pseudo-time series of risk factors {(
Rm,tb − Rf ,tb
)b
, SMBb
tb
,HMLb
tb
,RMWb
tb
,CMAb
tb
}
 by randomly drawing risk factors from 
the original risk factor vector 
{(
Rm,t − Rf ,t
)
, SMBt,HMLt,RMWt,CMAt
}
 with 
replacements.
(9)
Rp,t − Rf ,t = ?̂?p + 𝛽p
(
Rm,t − Rf ,t
)
+ ŝpSMBt + ĥpHMLt + r̂pRMWt + ĉpCMAt + ?̂?p,t.
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Fourth, we generate a time series of pseudo-daily excess returns 
(
Rp,t − Rf ,t
)b in the roll-
ing window, imposing the null hypothesis of zero true performance (αp = 0):
where t = Tp,1,… , Tp,252; tb = Tbp,1,… , Tbp,252.
Finally, we regress the pseudo-daily excess returns 
(
Rp,t − Rf ,t
)b on the five factors:
The simulated ?̂?b
p
 represents the sampling variation around zero true performance, 
entirely due to random chance (luck). Repeating the above steps in each of the 4420 rolling 
windows from January 1996 to June 2013, we obtain a time series of simulated alphas, {
?̂?b
p
}
 , and their corresponding t-statistics, 
{
t̂?̂?b
p
}
 . We then order all simulated ?̂?b
p
 into a 
cumulative distribution function (CDF) of simulated ?̂?b
p
 —a separate time series of luck dis-
tribution from the worst performing rolling window to the best performing rolling window, 
all of which are completely due to sell-side analysts’ luck rather than their skill. We repeat 
the above bootstrapping simulation a large number of times, say, b = 1, …, 5000.
Note that our approach measures the performance distribution of the best performing 
rolling windows not just by resampling from distribution of the ex-post best performing 
rolling windows, but using the information about luck represented by all rolling windows. 
This is a major difference between our approach and those employed in prior studies, as 
they generally ignore the possibility that luck distribution encountered by all other per-
formance distributions also provides highly valuable and relevant information (see, White 
2000; Cuthbertson et al. 2008).
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 C. Su et al.
1 3
Colker S (1963) An analysis of security recommendations by brokerage houses. Q Rev Econ Bus 
3:19–28
Cowles A (1933) Can stock market forecasters forecast? Econometrica 1:309–324
Cuthbertson K, Nitzsche D, O’Sullivan N (2008) UK mutual fund performance: skill or luck? J Empir 
Financ 15:613–634
Dimson E, Fraletti P (1986) Brokers’ recommendations: the value of a telephone tip. Econ J 96:139–159
Ellis M, Thomas DC (2004) Momentum and the FTSE 350. J Asset Manage 5:25–36
Fama EF (1998) Market efficiency, long-term returns and behavioral finance. J Financ Econ 49:283–306
Fama EF, French KR (1993) Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds. J Financ Econ 
33:3–56
Fama EF, French KR (2010) Luck versus skill in the cross-section of mutual fund returns. J Financ 
65:1915–1947
Fama EF, French KR (2015) A five-factor asset pricing model. J Financ Econ 116:1–22
Fang LH, Yasuda A (2014) Are stars’ opinions worth more? The relation between analyst reputation and 
recommendation values. J Financ Serv Res 46:235–269
Green C (2006) The value of client access to analyst recommendations. J Financ Quant Anal 41:1–24
Gregory A, Tharyan R, Christidis A (2013) Constructing and testing alternative versions of the Fama-
French and Carhart models in the UK. J Bus Financ Account 40:172–214
Grossman SJ, Stiglitz JE (1980) On the impossibility of informationally efficient markets. Am Econ Rev 
70:393–408
Groth JC, Lewellen WG, Schlarbaum GG, Lease RC (1979) An analysis of brokerage house securities 
recommendations. Financ Anal J 35:32–40
Gu F, Wang W (2005) Intangible assets, information complexity, and analysts’ earnings forecasts. J Bus 
Financ Account 32:1673–1702
Hirshleifer D, Hsu P-H, Li D (2018) Innovative originality, profitability, and stock returns. Rev Financ 
Stud 31:2553–2605
Hobbs J, Kovacs T, Sharma V (2012) The investment value of the frequency of analyst recommendation 
changes for the ordinary investor. J Empir Financ 19:94–108
Hong H, Kubik JD (2003) Analyzing the analysts: career concerns and biased earnings forecasts. J 
Financ 58:313–351
Hong H, Stein JC (1999) A unified theory of underreaction, momentum trading, and overreaction in 
asset markets. J Financ 54:2143–2184
Hudson R, Dempsey M, Keasey K (1996) A note on the weak form efficiency of capital markets: the 
application of simple technical trading rules to UK stock prices – 1935 to 1994. J Bank Financ 
20:1121–1132
Irvine PJ (2004) Analysts’ forecasts and brokerage-firm trading. Account Rev 79:125–149
Ivkovic Z, Jegadeesh N (2004) The timing and value of forecast and recommendation revisions. J Financ 
Econ 73:433–463
Jackson AR (2005) Trade generation, reputation, and sell-side analysts. J Financ 60:673–717
Jegadeesh N, Kim W (2006) Value of analyst recommendations: international evidence. J Financ Mark 
9:274–309
Jegadeesh N, Kim W (2010) Do analysts herd? An analysis of recommendations and market reactions. 
Rev Financ Stud 23:901–937
Jegadeesh N, Kim J, Krische SD, Lee CMC (2004) Analyzing the analysts: when do recommendations 
add value? J Financ 59:1083–1124
Keim DB, Madhavan A (1998) The cost of institutional equity trades. Financ Anal J 54:50–69
Kucheev YO, Ruiz F, Sorensson T (2017) Do stars shine? Comparing the performance persistence 
of star sell-side analysts listed by institutional investor, the Wall Street Journal, and StarMine. J 
Financ Serv Res 52:277–305
Kwon SS (2002) Financial analysts’ forecast accuracy and dispersion: high-tech versus low-tech stocks. 
Rev Quant Financ Acc 19:65–91
Li X, Brooks C, Miffre J (2009) Low-cost momentum strategies. J Asset. Manage 9:366–379
Ljungqvist A, Malloy C, Marston F (2009) Rewriting history. J Financ 64:1935–1960
Logue DE, Tuttle DL (1973) Brokerage house investment advice. Financ Rev 8:38–54
Lyon JD, Barber BM, Tsai C-L (1999) Improved methods for tests of long-run abnormal stock returns. J 
Financ 54:165–201
Markowitz TJ, Grinblatt M (1999) Do industries explain momentum? J Financ 54:1249–1290
Mehran H, Stulz RM (2007) The economics of conflicts of interest in financial institutions. J Financ 
Econ 85:267–296
On the investment value of sell-side analyst recommendation…
1 3
Mikhail MB, Walther BR, Willis RH (2004) Do security analysts exhibit persistent differences in stock 
picking ability? J Financ Econ 74:67–91
Nolte I, Nolte S, Vasios M (2014) Sell-side analysts’ career concerns during banking stresses. J Bank 
Financ 49:424–441
Novy-Marx R, Velikov M (2016) A taxonomy of anomalies and their trading costs. Rev Financ Stud 
29:104–147
Rees L, Sharp NY, Wong PA (2017) Working on the weekend: do analysts strategically time the release 
of their recommendation revisions? J Corp Financ 45:104–121
Ryan P, Taffler RJ (2006) Do brokerage houses add value? The market impact of UK sell-side analyst 
recommendation changes. Brit Account Rev 38:371–386
Stickel SE (1995) The anatomy of the performance of buy and sell recommendations. Financ Anal J 
51:25–39
Su C, Zhang H (2018) A time-series bootstrapping simulation method to distinguish sell-side analysts’ skill 
from luck. Working paper, Newcastle University Business School
Sun J (2011) The effect of analyst coverage on the informativeness of income smoothing the international. 
Int J Account 46:333–349
Timmermann A, Granger CWJ (2004) Efficient market hypothesis and forecasting. Int J Forecasting 
20:15–27
White H (2000) A reality check for data snooping. Econometrica 68:1097–1126
Womack KL (1996) Do brokerage analysts’ recommendations have investment value? J Financ 51:137–167
